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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENTU.C.A., 78-2a-3(2)(a) confers jurisdiction of this appeal on a final order from a
formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency on the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW-

No. 1-

Did the Hearing Officer err in granting summary judgment
by not setting forth the reasons supporting his grant of
summary judgment?

Preservation of Issue:
Appellants disputed, material facts included that the subrogation policy provisions:
were unenforceable in that they:
A-

were ambiguous in failing to define several material, technical terms.
Record, @ 92, 94-97, 104-106, 275-282, Hearing Transcript,
@ 347, pages 9-10, & 12-15.

VI

B-

were not set forth in clear language readily understandable by the average
purchaser of insurance.
Record, @ 93-96, 104, 276-278, 280-283, Hearing Transcript
@ 347, pages 10, 12-15, & 17.

C-

violated Utah's "common fund" doctrine?
Record, @ 102-104, 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 13-14.

D-

were contained in the Plan's "Master Policy" that Appellee never
Presented to Appellants?
Record, @ 92, 96-97, 103-106, 272-274, 279, 281, 286-288,
Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 9-10

E-

were invalidly incorporated by reference into the Enrollment Form,
the Appellants' insurance contract with Appellee.
Record, @ 80 @ Exhibit "B", Section C, 103, 104, 272-274, 276,
284, 286-288, - Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 9-10, .

F-

contained in an adhesion contract.
Record, @ 96, 106, 195, 276, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages
12-13 & 17.

G-

were hidden deeply in the policy.
Record, @ 21-22, 104,279.

H-

became operative automatically.
Record, @ 21, 100, 104,279]

Appellants further argued that Appellee:
I-

had no standing to bring its Petition for a Declaratory Judgment.
Record, @ 92-93, 106, 284, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 8-12.

Vll

J-

should have been required to show that Appellant Rose Kramer
was "made whole" by her settlements.
Record, @ 93-94, 97-99, 104, 282, Hearing Transcript
@ 347, pages 15-16.

K-

could not show that Appellants knowingly waived their "made whole"
doctrine rights.
Record, @ 98, 101, 159, 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 11-12, & 15-17.

L-

had not given Appellants proper notice of the policy's terms and
limitations.
Record, @ 272-273, 284, 286-288, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 12-13.

And that:
M-

to enforce the subrogation provision would result in:
a-

Appellee receiving a "double recovery."
Record, 101-102, 104, 276, 278, 279, 283, 289, Hearing
Transcript @ 347, pages 13-14.

b-

a violation of the Appellants' "reasonable expectations."
Record, @ 281-282, 286-288, Hearing Transcript,
@ 347, page 16.

c-

Appellants suffering a grave financial injustice.
Record, @ 105, 283-284

The standard for review is that a party's entitlement to a summary judgment is a
question of law. Thus, the reviewing court looks for "correctness" and views the

facts in a light most favorable to the losing party and in doing so it accords no
deference to the trial court's rulings.
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d231, 235 [UT., 1993]; State v. Ferree,
784 P.2d 149, 151 [Utah, 1998]; Salt Lake City v. James Construction, 761 P.2d
42, 45, [Ut. App. 1998]; State y. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 [Utah, 1994]; U. R. C. P.
Rule 56 (b), Larson y. Park City, 955 P.2d 343, 345 [Utah, 1998]; Sulzen v.
Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 500 [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]; Themy y. Seagull Enters., 595
P. 2d 526, [Utah, 1979]; Briggs y. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 [Ut. App., 1987];
Copper State Leasing y. Blacker Appliance, 770 P.2d 88 [Utah, 1988]; Reeyes
y. Geigy Pharm., 764 P.2d 636 [Ut. App, 1988]; Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dey. y.
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 [Utah App, 1992]; Blue Cross Blue Shield y. State,
779 P.2d 634 [Utah, 1989].

No. 2-

Did the Hearing Officer err when he did not consider
Appellants' arguments that all the facts needed to be
yiewed and understood from the contentions and
consequences of those facts?

Preservation of Issue:
This is a legal mandate governing the trial court's decision making processes. It
need not be preserved in the Record.

IX

No. 3

Did the Hearing Officer err in not viewing the facts
and all reasonable inferences there from in a light
favorable to Appellants?

Preservation of Issue:
This is a legal mandate governing the trial court's decision making procedures. It
need not be preserved in the Record.
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate court review looks at the
trial court's factual findings from a clearly erroneous standard, i.e., so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v.Young, 979
P.2d 338, 342 [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932, 937 [Utah,
1998]; Grossen v. DeWitt, 369 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 31, 32 [Ut. Ct. App., 1999];
Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214 [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]; Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234, 1242 [Utah, 1998] cert denied; State v. 663 E. 640 No., 942 P.2d
925, 931 [Utah, 1997]; Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 45, 46 [Ut.
Ct. App., 1999] Woodard v. Fazzio, 923 P.2d 474, 477 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]; State
ex. rel State, 928 P.2d 393, 398 [Ut. Ct. App., 1996]; Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338 [Utah, 1979]; Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 [Ut. Ct.
App., 1995].

The standard for review to a challenge of the trial court's conclusions of law finds
the reviewing court looking for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 [UT., 1993];

x

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994]; State v. Ferree, 784 P.2d 149, 151
[Utah, 1998]; Salt Lake City v. James Construction, 761 P.2d 42, 45, [Ut. App.
1998]; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 [Utah, 1994]; U. R. C. P. Rule 56 (b), Larson
v. Park City, 955 P.2d 343, 345 [Utah, 1998]; Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497,
500[Ut.Ct. App., 1999];

No. 4-

Did the Hearing Officer err in finding that Appellee had
standing to bring its Request for a Declaratory Judgment?

Preservation of Issue:
Record, @ 284, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 8-11
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate court review looks at the
trial court's factual findings from a clearly erroneous standard, i.e., so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Young v.Young, 979
P.2d 338, 342 [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d 932, 937 [Utah,
1998]; Grossen v. DeWitt, 369 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 31, 32 [Ut. Ct. App., 1999];
Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214 [Ut. Ct. App., 1999]; Jeffs v. Stubbs,
970 P.2d 1234, 1242 [Utah, 1998] cert denied; State v. 663 E. 640 No., 942 P.2d
925, 931 [Utah, 1997]; Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 45, 46, [Ut.
Ct. App., 1999] Woodard v. Fazzio, 923 P.2d 474, 477 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]; State
ex. rel ST, 928 P.2d 393, 398 [Ut. Ct. App., 1996]; Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d

xi

1336, 1338 [Utah, 1979]; Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 [Ut. Ct.
App, 1995].

The standard for review to a challenge of the trial court's conclusions of law finds
the reviewing court looking for "correctness" and accords no deference to the trial
court's rulings. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, [UT, 1993];
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, [Utah, 1994].

The appellate court review looks at the trial court's factual findings from a clearly
erroneous standard, i.e., so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 [Utah, 1999]; Pennington v.
Allstate, 973 P.2d 932, 937 [Utah, 1998]; Grossen v. DeWitt, 369 Ut. Adv. Rpt.
31, 32, [Ut. Ct. App, 1999]; Johnson v. Higlev, 977 P.2d 1209, 1214, [Ut. Ct.
App, 1999]; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 [Utah, 1998] cert denied; State
v. 663 E. 640 No., 942 P.2d 925, 931 [Utah, 1997]; Williamson v. Williamson,
372 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 45, 46, [Ut. Ct. App, 1999]; Woodard v. Fazzio, 923 P.2d 474,
477 [Ut. Ct. App, 1991]; State ex. rel State, 928 P.2d 393, 398 [Ut. Ct. App,
1996]; Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 [Utah, 1979]; Campbell v.
Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 [Ut. Ct. App, 1995].

xii

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONSU. C. A. 31A-21-106,
U.C. A., 49-11-101,
U.C. A., 49-11-102,
U.C. A., 49-11-613,
U. C. A., 49-20-401(e),

STATEMENT OF CASERespondent/Appellants are insureds under Utah's State Retirement Board's
[Petitioners' & Appellees'] "Public Employees' Health Plan", [PEHP].
After a motor vehicle crash, PEHP paid some of Appellant ROSE KRAMER'S
medical bills. Later, Rose Kramer secured a settlement of the adverse driver's
$100,000 liability policy limit. Subsequently, PEHP demanded 100%
reimbursement for the medical bills it paid in Appellants' behalf. PEHP paid a bit
over $30,000 for Appellant Rose Kramer's medical bills. Appellees demanded full
reimbursement under the "subrogation provisions" of the PEHP.

Appellants declined to pay any reimbursement believing the subrogation
provisions of the PEHP were unenforceable for a variety of legal and factual
reasons. The State Retirement Board via PEHP then filed a "Request For

xiii

Declaratory Judgment." Appellants formally opposed this Request. The State
Retirement Board appointed the honorable, RICHARD C. HOWE, as the Hearing
Officer to preside over the claim. Discovery commenced.

Later, Appellees filed for a summary judgment arguing in a summarily and conclusionary way that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
because there was no genuine issues of material fact between the parties.
Appellants opposed the Motion with formal "points and authorities." Appellees
filed formal reply points and authorities.

In late July, 2007, the parties argued their respective positions before the Hearing
Officer. He took the matter under advisement and on 07/30/07, issued his
"Ruling" granting Appellees summary judgment.

Appellants appeal from the grant of summary judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTSAt all relevant times, Respondent/Appellant KELLY KRAMER was a Utah
Highway Patrol Officer and enrolled in the Public Employee's Health Plan
[PEHP]. Respondent/Appellant ROSE KRAMER was his spouse and an insured
under the PEHP. On or about September 29, 2001, ROSE KRAMER was involved

xiv

in a motor vehicle crash wherein she suffered significant injuries. In that motor
vehicle crash, Rose Kramer, then 38 years old, suffered:

AB-

a tri-level anterior cervical discectomy;
a post surgical 25% to 28% whole person impairment;

CD-

a 15% to 27% future loss of earnings;
about $50,000 in medical bills;

E-

about $ 10,000 in costs in prosecuting her claims against the tortfeasor;

F-

in excess of $500,000 in past and future special damages.

and,

In full settlement of her crash injuries, Rose Kramer received the liability policy
limit of $100,000 from the at-fault driver and another $10,000, the policy limit,
under her UIM coverage. [Record, @ 92-93, 106, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
page 13]

During the recovery phase of her injuries, Petitioners / Appellees PEHP paid
approximately $30,000 in medical benefits. It did not however, pay all the medical
bills generated in the care and treatment of Rose Kramer's crash injuries. Subsequently, PEHP demanded 100% reimbursement for the monies it paid in medical
care benefits.

Appellants refused to pay any money to PEHP arguing that under the law, they
believed that PEHP was not entitled to any reimbursement.

xv

Appellees PEHP then filed a Request for Declaratory Judgment with the Utah
State Retirement Board. Record, @ 1-88 Appellants opposed it. Record, @
92-107 The Board assigned the Honorable Richard C. Howe as the Hearing
Officer. Discovery commenced.

Later, Appellees filed a summary judgment motion. Record, @ 228-259
Appellants opposed it. Record, @ 272-287 On 07/10/07, Hearing Officer Howe
presided over a hearing on the summary judgment motion, took it under
advisement and subsequently granted it.

In opposing the summary judgment motion, Appellants made numerous factual and
legal arguments that properly should have precluded summary judgment. But the
Hearing Officer "summarily" found no genuine issues of material fact notwithstanding that Appellants had set forth several, contested, material factual issues.
Further, the Hearing Officer adopted many of Appellee's positions notwithstanding
the many, controverted material "facts" Appellants had pled. Record, @ 334
Additionally, Appellants asserted that the Public Employees Health Plan:
1-

lack standing to bring its "Request for Declaratory Judgment."
[Record, @ 92-93, 106, 284, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 8-12]

2-

that Rose Kramer was not "made whole" by her settlements, thus
precluding the Plan from reimbursement.
[Record, @ 93-94, 97- 99, 104, 282, Hearing Transcript
@ 347, pages 15-16]

And,
3-

because PEHP never presented a copy of the Plan to Appellants it could
not enforce its subrogation provisions.
[Record, @ 92, 96-97, 104-106, 279, 281, Hearing Transcript,
@ 347 @ pages 9-10]

Appellants also contested that Appellees had no enforceable subrogation rights
because the PEHP:
4-

was ambiguous in the material "reimbursement/subrogation" provisions

because the operative, material, technical terms were left undefined, and that
properly resolving the ambiguity in Appellants' favor would deny the Plan any
reimbursement.
[Record, @ 92, 94-97, 104-106, 275-281, Hearing Transcript, @ 347,
pages 9-10, 12-15]

5-

limited coverage by the subrogation provisions but this 'limitation or

exclusion" was not set forth in clear language readily understood by the average
purchaser of insurance.
[Record, @ 93-96, 104, 276-278, 280-283, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 10, 12-15 & 17.]

XVll

6-

had subrogation provisions that:
• were unenforceable because many operative, material terms
were not defined.
[Record, @ 92, 94-97, 104, 106, 275-282, Hearing Transcript @
347, pages 9-10, 12-13]

• were hidden deeply in the policy.

[Record, @ 21-22, 104, 279]

• became operative automatically.

[Record, @ 21, 100, 104, 279]

• would give the PEHP a "double recovery."
[Record, @ 101-102, 104, 276, 278-279, 283, 289, Hearing
Transcript, @ 347, pages 13-14]
• violated Utah's "common fund" doctrine.
[Record, @ 102-104, 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 13-14]
• would result in Appellants suffering an injustice.
[Record,® 105, 283-284,]
And,
• violated Utah's case law holdings of the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine.
[Record, @ 281-282, 286-288, Hearing Transcript @ 347, page 16]

xvm

7-

By withholding/failing to produce the policy and by failing to define
material, operative and technical terms, PEHP did not give proper notice to
Appellants of the terms and limitations of the policy.
[Record, @ 272-273, 286-288, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 12-13]

8-

was not the Appellants' "insurance contract." That is, Appellants signed the
"Enrollment Form" which mentioned the PEHP but it did not have the PEHP
attached. Thus, legally PEHP cannot enforce a document not attached to the
contract/Enrolment Form.
[Record, @ 92, 96-97, 103-104, 272-274, 281, 286-288, Hearing Transcript,
@ 347 @ pages 9-10]

9-

that the Appellants did not make a knowing waiver of their "made whole"
doctrine rights.
[Record, @ 98, 101, 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 11-12, 15-17]

And that,
10-

Appellee's plan is an adhesion contract.
[Record, @ 96, 106, 195, 276, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 12-13, 17]

Though requested to do so, when the Hearing Officer granted the summary
judgment he did not address the specific questions that were before him. His grant
of summary judgment was absent any details or findings of fact or conclusions of
xix

law on the multiple of issues before him. [Record, @ Ruling 322-323, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, @ 336-339] Accordingly, Appellants appeal the
07/30/07 Ruling and the 08/20/07 Findings and the Hearing Officer's Orders that
surrounding these administrative decisions.

************

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-

No. 1-

Did the Hearing Officer err in granting summary judgment
by not setting forth the reasons supporting his grant of
summary judgment?
Did he err in not finding any disputed issues of material fact
from the many factual disputes Appellants presented to him?
Did he err in not offering any legal authority to support his grant
of summary judgment?

The Hearing Officer found no genuine issues of material fact when Appellants had
set forth many contested material factual issues. Further, the Hearing Officer
relied upon, and adopted Appellees5 positions notwithstanding the controverted
"facts" Appellants pled. The single legal authority he did adopt is error because it
does not stand for the finding he made under it.

XX

The disputed, material facts Appellants had asserted were that:
1-

Appellees lack standing to bring its Request for Declaratory Judgment,

2-

Appellant Rose Kramer was not "made whole" by her settlements,

3-

because Appellees never presented a copy of the Plan to Appellants it could
not enforce its subrogation provisions;

4-

the Plan was ambiguous in the material "reimbursement/subrogation"
provisions;

5-

properly resolving the ambiguity in Appellants5 favor would deny the Plan
any reimbursement.

6-

the Plan limited its coverage by the subrogation provisions but these
provisions were not set forth in clear language readily understood by the
average purchaser of insurance.

7-

Appellees did not give Appellants proper notice of the terms and limitations
of the policy.

8-

the Plan itself was not the Appellants' "insurance contract." That is,
Appellants signed the "Enrollment Form" which mentioned the PEHP's
Master Policy but in violation of U.C.A. 31A-21-106 and Cullum v.
Farmers, 857 P.2d 922 [Utah 1993] did not have the policy attached .
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9-

the Appellants did not make a known waiver of their "made whole" doctrine
rights.

And,
10-

the subrogation provisions were unenforceable because:
• because many operative, material terms were not defined.
•

were hidden deeply in the policy.

•

became operative automatically.

•

would give the PEHP a "double recovery."

•

violated Utah's case law holdings of the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine.

•

violated Utah's "common fund" doctrine. And because,

•

to enforce them would cause Appellants5 grave financial injury.

Though these were the many issues place before him, the Hearing Officer did not
address any of them save one, i.e., Appellees' standing to bring its Request for
Declaratory Judgment. On this one issue he did decide, however, the statute he
adopted to support his position does not support his finding.

Notwithstanding these many documented disputes over material facts, the Hearing
Officer summarily concluded that:

Ifound that the facts pleaded and relied upon by the
Petitioner are true and uncontested. Record, @ 334
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But the record is barren of any reasoning as to how or why he found all of the
above facts "uncontested." The mandates of the law require him to make findings
on all material issues presented to him. He failed to do so requiring reversal of his
grant of summary judgment. Additionally, he did not make any legal conclusions
as he was required to do so under the many issues put before him for resolution.
This failure also requires reversal of his Order.

No. 2-

Did the Hearing Officer err when he did not consider
Appellants' arguments that all the facts needed to be
viewed [or understood] from the contentions and
consequences of those facts.

Given the Appellants challenged Appellees' "Undisputed Disputed Facts" and
presented several more facts that were "in issue55 and that controverted or
explained the consequences of Appellees' facts, the Hearing Officer did not
consider Appellants' facts nor view said facts in a light favorable to Appellants.
That is, for the Hearing Officer to have held that:

Ifound that the facts pleaded and relied upon by the
Petitioner are true and uncontested. Record, @ 334

clearly shows he did not consider that the facts he did find "uncontested" can still
be in dispute if the parties disagree on the understandings, contentions, and
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consequences of those facts. Since the parties debate a major difference in the
understanding, contentions and consequences of the facts, e.g.:

A-

Appellants' "reasonable expectations" in purchasing insurance
vs. paying their insurer back for coverage they paid for.

B-

Appellees contending that Appellants are bound by an
insurance policy never presented to them.

C-

Appellees contending that Appellants are bound to material
terms in an insurance policy that are not defined in the policy
and were never explained.

D-

Appellees contending that the insurance contract legal incorporated by reference the 75 page, Master Policy which was not
attached to the Enrollment Form contract.

And,
E-

Appellees contending that Appellants knowingly waived their
"Made Whole" doctrine rights.

Obviously, the legal ramifications surrounding each of these five contests, creates
"material factual disputes" precluding summary judgment.

No. 3-

Did the Hearing Officer err in granting summary judgment
in not viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Appellants?

In not finding any "contested" facts, it is apparent the Hearing Officer did not view
the Appellants' facts, nor the reasonable inferences stemming from their facts, in a
light most favorable to Appellants. But legally, he was required to do so. In
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failing to do so, and from that failure to summarily conclude there are no material
factual disputes is manifest error requiring the vacation of his grant of summary
judgment.

No. 4-

Did the Hearing Officer err in finding Appellees had standing
to bring its Request for Declaratory Judgment?

The only finding the Hearing Officer made was that he found Appellees had
standing to bring its Request for Declaratory Judgment. But he did not justify this
finding by memorializing any support in fact or law. He did however, adopt
Appellee's counsel's reference to U.C.A., 49-11-613.

But a closer look at this statute shows it does not support the finding that the Board
and/or PEHP had authority/standing to bring the Request for Declaratory
Judgment. Under the relevant law, only a "person" has standing to bring a
declaratory action. Appellees are not persons but they are "things."

Interestingly, the Retirement Board and/or PEHP requested a review by a hearing
officer all the while sidestepping the pre-requisite request for an initial ruling from
the executive director. And they did this without any authority, without any
standing to bring the Request for Declaratory Judgment they did bring.
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Clearly, the statute does not confer authority upon the Board or the Plan to bring a
declaratory action. Yet, it is the statute the Hearing Officer adopted and relied
upon to support his legal conclusion. But when the legal conclusion relied upon
does not stand for the proposition proffered, it cannot survive appellate review.

Appellants assert that under U. C. A., 49-11-613, Appellees lack standing to bring
the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment. This statute defines those who
are permitted to bring an action hereunder. PEHP is not mentioned as a person or
entity entitled to bring an action before a hearing officer or the Board.

Appellees have no standing to have brought these proceedings and in so bringing
them the Request is invalid and must be rejected. While the legislature could have
conferred upon the Board or the Plan authority to bring an action like this, it did
not do so.
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A R G U M E N T SMARSHALING EVIDENCEGenerally, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the challenged
judgment/findings and then go forward showing just why the marshaled evidence
is legally insufficient to sustain the judgment/verdict. But this base root of
appellate advocacy is not without exception. The operative laws state that if the
trial court's findings are legally insufficient, an appellant need not engage in a
futile marshalling of [insufficiently detailed] evidence. The appellate courts say
that if the trial court's findings are so insufficient that they fail to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings they fail to provide enough
information for a meaningful review by the appellate court. When the trial court's
findings are inadequate for a meaningful understanding by the appellate court,
appellant need only show the court's findings as legal insufficient. Campbell v.
Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 639 [Ut. Ct. App., 1995]; Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d
474, 477 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]
Appellants assert there are no administrative court findings on all of the factual and
legal issues that were before it and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order made is so totally barren of any basic information that a party
cannot track any of the factual or evidentiary findings that underpin the grant of
summary judgment. In being totally void of the basic facts and legal reasoning

behind the grant of summary judgment, one simply cannot marshaling absent
evidence.

Appellants attack the administrative court's ruling on its failure to present the
necessary information for a proper appellate review There is one issue the Hearing
Officer did address and under that dispute he has offered a finding based upon
some recited legal foundation, Appellants have marshal the evidence on that single
dispute.

No. 1-

Did the Hearing Officer err in granting summary
judgment by not setting forth the reasons supporting
his grant of summary judgment?
Did he err in not finding any disputed issues of material
fact from the many factual disputes Appellants presented
to him?
Did he err in not offering any legal authority to support
his grant of summary judgment?

Appellants disputed, material, operative facts included that the subrogation policy
provisions were unenforceable because they:
A-

were ambiguous in failing to define several material, technical, operative
terms and that the law requires all ambiguities to be resolved against
Appellees as the contract drafter and in Appellants' favor.
Record, @ 92, 94-97, 104-106, 275-278, 279-282, Hearing
Transcript @ 347, pages 9-10, & 12-15.
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While the Policy admits to the absence of these material definitions, and Appellees
have agreed that to omit terms in a contract makes the contract ambiguous, the
Hearing Officer still ignored the issue. Record, @ 277 & 281, 295 & 299,
Hearing Transcript, @ page 15.

Continuing, the subrogation policy provisions are unenforceable because they:

B-

were not set forth in clear language readily understandable by the average
purchaser of insurance.
Record, @ 93-96, 104, 276-278, 280-283, Hearing Transcript
@ 347, pages 10, 12-15, & 17.

C-

were contained in the Plan/policy that Appellees never presented or
explained to Appellants.
Record, @ 92, 96-97, 104-106, 272-273, 279, 281, 286-288,
Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 9-10

D-

were invalidly incorporated by reference into the Enrollment Form,
the Appellants' insurance contract with Appellees.
Record, @ 103, 104, 272-274, 276, 284, 286-288, Hearing
Transcript @ 347, pages 9-10.
See also Record, @ 7 & 86 [Appellees' Exhibits "A" & "B"]

E-

were contained in an adhesion contract.
Record, @ 96, 195, 276, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages
12-13 & 17.
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F-

were hidden deeply in the policy.
Record, @ 21-22, 104,279.

And,
G-

became operative automatically.
Record, @ 21, 100, 104, 279, Hearing Transcript, @ page 3]

Appellants further argued that Appellees:

H-

had no standing to bring its Petition for a Declaratory Judgment.
Record, @ 284, Hearing Transcript @ 347, pages 8-11

I-

should have been required to show that Appellant Rose Kramer
was "made whole" by her settlements.
Record, 93-94, 97-99, 104, 282, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 15-16.

J-

could not show that Appellants knowingly waived their "made whole"
doctrine rights.
Record, 98, 101, @ 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 11-12, & 17.

K-

had not given Appellants proper notice of the policy's terms and
limitations.
Record, @ 272-273, 284, 286-288, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 12-13.

And finally that:
L-

to enforce the subrogation provisions would result in:
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a-

a violation of Utah's "common fund" doctrine.
Record, @ 102-104, 283, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
pages 13-14.

b-

a violation of the Appellants' "reasonable expectations."
Record, @ 281-282, 286-288, Hearing Transcript @ 347,
page 16.

c-

Appellees receiving a "double recovery,"
Record, 101-102, 104, 276, 278, 279, 283, 289, Hearing
Transcript @ 347, pages 13-14.

d-

Appellants suffering a grave financial injustice.
Record,® 105, 283-284

And,

Notwithstanding that all of these issues were before the Hearing Officer and that
Appellants specifically asked him to decide each one, [Record, @ 326, 330] he
"summarily" found no genuine issues of material fact existed on any of the above
proffered material, factual disputes.

[Note: The Hearing Officer did find that Appellee's standing to bring the Petition,
but he made this conclusion without offering why he believed this and the legal
authority cited does not support his finding. Record, @ 338 Accordingly this
"stand alone" finding and conclusion is likewise fatally defective. See argument,
infra.]

In his 08/22/07, "Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Summary
Judgment" eleven "Findings of Fact" are noted. But none of these eleven "facts"

are the Hearing Officer's own findings of fact. That is, none of these "facts" are
found in his 07/30/07 Ruling. This Ruling states only:

1-

The Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

4-

Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare an appropriate Order in
conformity with this Ruling.
Record, @ 322

In his 08/20/07 letter directive, he found only that 1- Appellees have standing and,
2- the subrogation clause is legally enforceable. Record, @ 334

But the subsequent, 08/22/07, "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on Motion for Summary Judgment" then goes on to conveniently add
several "facts55 well beyond the 07/30/07 Ruling. Petitioner's counsel drafted this
"Order.55

.... I provided the facts from the Memorandum in Support of
the Motion for Summary Judgment in the proposed order.
Appellee's Counsel's letter to Hearing Officer, Record,@ 328
Additionally, the "Conclusions of Law55 set forth in this document, are likewise
both self-serving and totally absent any supporting "findings of fact55 or legal
authority. There is no evidence that the "conclusions55 set forth in the 08/22/07,
"Findings, Conclusions and Order55 were made by the Hearing Officer. Record, @
322
6

The Conclusions of Law set forth therein state:

1-

Petitioner has standing to bring this action against Respondents
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 49-11-613.
[No further reasoning nor any factual findings supporting this
conclusion are offered.]

2-

The contractual subrogation clause in the PEHP Master Policy is
legally enforceable.
[No reasoning whatsoever in fact or law is offered to support this
conclusion.]

3-

Petitioner is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
[This conclusion is made without the hearing officer having decided
or even commented upon the many disputed factual issues Appellants
had put before him.]

4-

The plain language of the PEHP Master Policy requires PEHP to be
reimbursed $30,047.45

[No further reasoning nor any factual findings supporting this conclusion are
offered. One cannot learn how or why the Hearing Officer found the
language so clear. But again, these are Appellees' counsel's conclusion and
not the Hearing Officer's.]

Record, @ 338
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While Appellants had set forth multiple, contested, material issues, the Hearing
Officer did not make any findings on any of them. He did however, adopt
Appellees' counsel's finding on the 08/22/07 Order. Appellants' counsel formally
objected to this approach to both the Hearing Officer and Appellees' counsel on
two occasions. Record, @ 326, & 330. Yet, the Hearing Officer failed to address
the Appellants' objections and simply adopted the Appellees' positions without
offering any facts or legal conclusions to support his adopted positions.

Appellants believe this Court must reverse the grant of summary judgment because
the paucity of the Hearing Officer's factual findings and legal conclusions are
manifestly insufficient to support the Order.
The Hearing Officer adopted the Appellees' positions when he had Appellees'
counsel draft the 08/22/07, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Then
counsel took liberties in adding facts and declaring conclusions of law. But to
merely adopt a party's position is not proper.

It is the duty of the trial judge in contested cases to find facts
upon all material issues submitted for decision unless the
findings are waived... The discretion of adopting the findings
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as submitted to the trial court is exclusively in that court qs_
long as the findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence.
Bover Co., v, Lisnell 567 P.2d 1112, 1113-1114;
[Utah, 1977] State v. All Real Property, 37 P.3d
276, 279; [Utah Ct. App., 2001]

In contradiction to the Boyer and State advice, here we find that:

A-

the Hearing Officer did not find any facts on the many of the issues
submitted to him; and that,

B-

without such factual findings one cannot argue whether they are
in conformity with, or in contradiction to, the evidence and/or the law.

The dictates of Boyer and State say that "adoption" is permitted but only when the
i(

findings are not clearly contrary to the evidence. " To inquire into the question if

the findings here are in conformity to the evidence, one looks to Ruling or Order.
In Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West Development, 970 P.2d 1273, 12811282, [Utah, 1998] our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of a request
to amend a complaint because the trial court failed to state the reasons supporting
the denial and because the reasons were not apparent from the Record. Instantly,
our Record is barren of the administrative court's reasons to grant summary
judgment.
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Without having the service of the Hearing Officer's reasoning in arriving at his
decision, one cannot compare his findings against the evidence. In consequence
thereto, under Aurora, this appellate court needs to reverse the grant of summary
judgment.

Moreover, for the Appellees' counsel's facts and conclusions of law that the
Hearing Officer did adopt, the Hearing Officer then failed to support the adopted
facts and conclusions with his reasoning processes or the legal authorities that led
him to said adoption.

The Appellants have a right to the Hearing Officer's independent judgment.
We made clear that the findings of fact adopted by the court
must be the result of the trial judge's independent judgment.

Judicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. They
are much more than findings of fact and conclusions of law;
they constitute the logical and analytical explanations of why
a judge arrived at a specific decision. They are tangible proof
to the litigants that the judge actiyely wrestled with their claims
and arguments and made a scholarly decision based on his or
her own reason and logic
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There is, however, an additional reason why a reversal and remand
is the appropriate remedy in this case. We made it clear that the
linchpin in using findings of fact, even when they are verbatim
adoptions of the parties 'proposals, is evidence that they are the
product of the trial court's independent judgment. PEDF, 153
F.3d @222 In this case there is no record evidence which would
allow us to conclude that the District Court conducted its own independent
review, or that the opinion is the product of its own
judgment. In fact, the procedure used by the District Court casts
doubt on the possibility of such a conclusion.
Bright v. Westmorland County, 380 F.3d 729, 731-732,
[U.S.D.C., 3rd Cir., 2004]

The case at bench dishonors the principles of Bright in that:

A-

There is no indication that the findings of fact the court adopted are
the result of the Hearing Officer's independent judgment.

B-

Both Appellants and this reviewing court have not a clue into the
logical and analytical explanations of why the Hearing Officer
arrived at [or adopted] a specific decision.

And,
C-

There is no record evidence which would allow this reviewing court
to conclude that the Hearing Officer conducted its own independent
review or that his opinions is the product of his own judgment.

For the Hearing Officer to make such a governing conclusion in granting summary
judgment and then deny the aggrieved party any inkling into the factual and legal
reasoning behind the conclusion is universally held to be error. The trial court
needs to properly rule on the issues presented to it. It must make "findings." Here
the Record is silent. There is no indication of the reasoning underlying the Hearing
Officer's rulings. When the record is silent in not providing the reasoning of how
or why the court arrived at its findings, the findings cannot be upheld. This
administrative court's rulings run contrary to the law's mandates under a long,
clear, legal history. To wit:

Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. " [citation]
[Like here] in the instant case, the court failed to separate its findings
of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 52a. Campbell
v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638-639 para 2 & 3 [Utah Ct. App., 1995].
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The trial court's findings of fact... were inadequate, where most of the
'findings " were conclusionary and more akin to conclusions of law, and
provided no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial's court decision
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 479 para 6 [Ut. Ct. App., 1991]

Because the trial court's finding is devoid of any analysis concerning
the statutory criteria

the finding cannot be upheld. It was error to

[make conclusion] ....without applying the statutory standard for making
such a determination. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 para 26
[Utah, 1999].

Like in Young, because we don't know what statutory standard the court used
in making its determination, the conclusion is legal error. This finds the
Hearing Officer's foundationless conclusions fatally defective to the grant of
summary judgment.

Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is
reversible error unless the facts in the record are (i clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment. " The findings of fact must show that the court's judgment
or decree 'follows logically from and is supported by, the evidence. "
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The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached. State v. Real Property - 633 East 640
North, 942 P.2d 925, 931, para 9 [Utah, 1997]

The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in
a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute under proper
rule of law. To that end findings of fact should be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. The rule as
stated in Prows v. Hawley, 111 P. 31 [Utah, 1928] is that: until the court
has found on all the material issues raised by the pleadings, the findings
are insufficient to support a judgment; and that findings should be
sufficiently distinct and certain as not to require an investigation or
review to determine what issues are decided. Rucker v. Dalton, 598
P.2d 1316, 1338-1339, para 2 [Utah, 1979].

Under each of the above issues, there are no conclusions of law nor supportive
findings of fact explaining how and why the court reached its decision. The
Hearing Officer summary declared: Ifound that the facts pleaded and relied upon
by the Petitioner are true and uncontested. Record, @ 334 The Hearing Officer
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did not address the material, disputed issues before him. Notwithstanding the
many factual disputes Appellant argued, he found the facts "uncontested."
Accordingly, the court must reverse his Ruling and the "Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order," he did make for being fatally defective in their
gross absence of mandated information.

This grant of summary judgment is wrong:

... because the party against whom a summary judgment is deprived
of the privilege of a trial, the record must be carefully scrutinized to
see if that party presents allegations which, if true, would entitle him
to judgment, if so, then summary judgment is improper.
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 [Utah, 1976]
Rich required the Hearing Officer to find the Appellants5 factual disputes and legal
conclusions false and that other reasonable minds would also so find. The Hearing
Officer did not follow the Rich analysis.

Further,
unless there is a showing that the disfavored parties cannot produce
evidence that would reasonably support a finding in their favor on a
material or determinative issue of fact, a summary judgment is erroneous.
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Bridge v. Backman, 353 P.2d 909, 910 [Utah, 1990]; Krantz v. Holt
819 P.2d 352, 356 [Utah, 1991]

Neither the Hearing Officer nor Appellees showed or even suggested that
Appellants cannot produce evidence that would reasonably support a
finding in their favor on a material or determinative issue of fact. Thus, the
grant of summary judgment was error.

The Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit ActThe specific authority this Hearing Officer acts under is the Utah State
Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act [U.C.A. 49-11-101, et seq.] This Act
has specific directives that a hearing officer shall follow in adjudicating claims. In
this instance, the Hearing Officer ignored the mandates on the exercise of his
authority under the Act. U.C.A., Section 49-11-613 address the responsibilities of
a State Retirement Board hearing officer. In pertinent part it states:

c-

hear and determine all facts pertaining to application for
benefits under any system plan

d-

make conclusions of law in determining the person's rights
under any system, plan....

The Hearing Officer acted in disregard of the Acts' specific mandates permitting
him to adjudicate claims: 1- in not determining any facts, and 2- in not making
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relevant conclusions of law. To disregard the mandates of one's judicial calling is
to render their findings invalid. Had the Hearing Officer followed the dictates of
the law and of the position he holds under the State Retirement Act, he would have
found material, factual disputes precluding the grant of summary judgment. Bill
Brown Realty v. Abbott, 652 P.2d 238 [Utah, 1977].

No. 2-

Did the Hearing Officer err when he did not consider
that all the facts needed to be viewed and understood
from the contentions and consequences of those facts?

Appellants did not dispute certain facts but asserted that the meanings, understanding, intentions and consequences of those facts created factual and legal
disputes precluding summary judgment. Record, @ 272-279, Hearing Transcript
@page 16.

Appellants voiced strong opposition to the Appellees' Statement of Facts
contesting the context that Appellees offered those facts. To wit:

A-

that Mr. Kramer's enrolled in the PEHP and signed the Enrollment Form.

B-

that by signing the Enrollment Form, Appellants agreed to the terms and
conditions of the PEHP Master Policy.
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And,
C-

that the subrogation provisions of the PEHP are controlling.

Appellants argued that since Appellees never gave a copy of the Plan to Appellants
or explained it to them, [Record, @ 272, 285, 286] and because the failure of the
Plan itself to define operative, material terms that notwithstanding enrolling and
signing the Enrollment Form, the Plans' subrogation provisions were not
enforceable against them. Record, @ 272-275, Hearing Transcript @ pages 9-10,
12& 15.

Appellants further argued that the Plan's subrogation provisions were not
controlling or enforceable because they:

a-

were ambiguous;

b-

since the ambiguities were in an adhesion contract, they would be
resolved in Appellants' favor;

c-

were against public policy;

d-

violated the Appellants' "reasonable expectations;"

e-

violated Utah's "common fund" doctrine;

f-

violated Utah's "made whole" doctrine;

g-

were hidden deeply in the policy;

and,
h-

became operative automatically.

Record, @ 275- 276, 279.
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Finally, Appellants argued that 1- if the subrogation provisions were enforced
Appellees would gain a "double recovery" in receiving both the Appellants'
insurance premium dollars together with the subrogation reimbursement monies
and that, 2- to enforce the subrogation provisions would result in a unjust,
inequitable result in causing Appellants to suffer a dear, financial injury. Record,
@ 279, Hearing Transcript @ page 13.

Should a trier of fact find any of these facts in Appellants' favor, then the legal
ramification of so finding would render the subrogation provisions unenforceable.

Moreover, there is a legal directive holding that material, factual disputes can arise
from the differences in the understandings, intentions, and consequences of
undisputed facts.

When the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts,
but the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts
were vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper for summary
judgment and could only be resolved by trial
Sandbers v.Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 [Utah, 1978]
When one cross references an undisputed fact against a party's different understanding, intention or consequences of that fact, the byproduct is a legal, material,
factual disputes, For example:
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A-

by signing the Enrollment Form, did Appellants agreed to the terms and
conditions of the PEHP Master Policy? Not necessarily when:

1-

operative technical terms are not defined/ever explained, and when
Appellants were not given a copy of the Plan. Understandably, one
cannot knowingly agree to unknown/undefined material terms.

Or,
B-

are the subrogation provisions of the PEHP controlling? Not necessarily
when:
1-

those provisions are invalid under Utah law for being ambiguous and

against public policy, and for being in violation Utah's "made whole" and
"common fund" doctrines, and because they repudiate the Appellants'
"reasonable expectations."

Each of the issues Appellants proffered against the Appellees' demand for
reimbursement constitutes a material, factual or legal dispute. To wit:

The law requires that:
1-

if the policy is ambiguous because of undefined material terms then
the subrogation provisions are not enforceable.

"A policy may be ambiguous if it is unclear or omits terms. " Falkner v.
Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 [UT 1983]; Ouaid v. U.S. Healthcare,
Ad. Rep., 2007 [Utah] 27, The PEHP omits terms and is unclear. If a
20

layperson could not/would not understand the term(s), it is incumbent upon
PEHP, the contract drafter, to explain the term(s) in understandable, lay
language. See McCoy v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield, 980 P.2d 694, (UT App.
1999). To fail to explain the operative, material terms is to lose the right to
enforce said terms.

2-

if the policy's limitations were not set forth in clear language readily
understandable by the average purchaser of insurance, the subrogation
provisions are not enforceable.
See Allstate v. Worthinston, 46 F.3d 1005, [10th Cir. 1995] quoting,
Draushton y. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v* 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 [Utah App.
1989]; U. S. Fidelity y. SandU 854 P.2d, 519, 524 [Utah, 1993] which hold
that limitations/exclusions on insurance coverage must be effected with
language that clearly identifies the scope of the limitation to the reasonable
purchaser of insurance. When the limitations are left undefined, they are not
clearly identified to the reasonable purchaser of insurance.

3-

If Appellees did not have standing to bring its Request for a Declaratory
Judgment, their claim must be dismissed with prejudice.
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The two governing statutes, UCA 49-11-613 and 49-20-401(e) finds PEHP
a "program" and programs can only "process claims." Suing insureds for
subrogation claims is not "processing claims."

4-

The law requires Appellees to show that Appellants Rose Kramer
was "made whole" by her settlements.

See Hill v. St. Farm* 765 P.2d 864, (1988) requiring the insurer to prove
their insured has been made whole by their settlement before any
subrogation rights can take effect. Likewise, U.C.A. 49-11-613(4) imposes
upon Appellees this same burden or proof.

5-

if Appellees never presented a copy of the PEHP Master Policy to
Appellants then it is not enforceable.

See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call* 712 P.2d 131, [Utah, 1985] which
found certain exclusion unenforceable because Farmers failed to furnish the
policy containing the exclusions to its' insured.

6-

if the PEHP's subrogation provisions violated Utah's "common fund"
doctrine then the provisions are not enforceable.

See Barkery. UT Public Serv. Comm.* 970 P.2d 702, 711 (UT., 1998) and,
Stewart v. UT Public Serv. Comm.* 885 P.2d 759 (UT. 1994) holding that
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those with valid/enforceable subrogation rights must contribute a fair share
of the total fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff in securing the settlement
fund monies.

7-

the law requires Appellees to show Appellants knowingly waived their
"made whole" doctrine rights. Absent the showing and Appellees cannot
enforce the subrogation provisions against Appellants.

U.C.A. 49-11-613(4) imposes upon Appellees this burden or proof.
The made whole doctrine can be modified by contract, but in the absence
of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be made whole before the
insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery from a third party
tortfeasor. Where the insured settles with the tortfeasor, the settlement
amount goes to the insured unless the insurer can prove that the insured has
already received full compensation. Hill v. St. Farm* 765 P.2d 864, 867 [2
&3](1988).

8-

If the PEHP Master Policy was not attached to the Enrollment Form, the
the insurance contract, but was only incorporated by reference then it is
not enforceable against Appellants. Record, @ Hearing Transcript @ pages
9-10.
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U. C. A., 31 A-21-106(l) states that one cannot incorporate by reference
any provision in an insurance policy unless the provision is set forth at
length therein. See also Cullum v. Farmers, 857 P.2d 992 [Utah, 1993]
for this same prohibition.

9-

If PEHP had not given Appellants proper notice of the policy's terms
and limitations, then the terms are not enforceable against Appellants.

When an insurer wants its insured to be bound by a policy provision, it needs
to show that the insured has had the opportunity to review the insurance
contract. McCoy v. Blue Cross - Blue Shield, 980 P.2d 694, 699. The insurer
is required to strictly comply with all the provisions that give an insured notice
of the terms, conditions, limitations, or changes to an insurance policy.
McCoy, supra, @ 695-696 An insured cannot have "notice" of "terms,
conditions or limitations" not defined, nor understood by merely "being
referred to" in the insurance contract.

10-

If, to enforce the subrogation provision would result in Appellees receiving a
"double recovery."

Appellees would receive a double recovery in that it received Appellants'
premium dollars for coverage of medical bills. It pays those medical bills
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and now wants 100% reimbursement of the dollars for the medical bills it
did pay. This is wrong and visits a grave, financial injustice to Appellants.

11-

If, to enforce the subrogation provisions would result in a violation of
Appellants' "reasonable expectations" the provisions will not be enforced.

Provisions that are against public policy or against the reasonable expectations of the parties may be found void in appropriate circumstances. Wasner
v. Farmers Insurance, 786 P.2d 763, 766-767 [Utah Ct. App., 1990]

12-

Since the subrogation provisions are hidden deeply in the policy, they are
not enforceable.

When provisions are hidden in a contract/policy and not brought to the
attention of the buyer the court will not enforce those provisions against the
buyer. In Christopher v. Larson Ford, 557 P.2d 1009, 1012 [Utah, 1976]
the court found a warranty disclaimer invalid because it was "hidden" and
not brought to the attention of the buyer: the law looks with disfavor upon
semi-concealed or obscured self-protective provisions of a contract prepared
by one party, which the other is not likely to notice. Id. @ 1012 See also
Bornhart v. Civil Service, 398 P.2d 873, 877 [Utah 1976].
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And,
13-

If, to enforce the subrogation provisions would result in Appellants suffering
a grave financial injury, the provisions should not be enforced.

Subrogation is not a matter of right but may be invoked only in circumstances where justice demands its application. Subrogation must not work
any injustice to the rights of others. Transamerica Ins. v. Barnes^ 505 P.2d
783, 786 [Utah, 1972]; St. Farm v. Northwest Natl Ins., 912 P.2d 983, 986
(Utah 1996).

Had the Hearing Officer viewed Appellants' arguments under the dictates of
Sandbers, supra, he would have found several disputed, material factual issues
precluding summary judgment. In failing/refusing to follow the mandates of the
law, his Order must be reversed.

No. 3-

Did the Hearing Officer err in not viewing the facts
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light
most favorable to Appellants?

In this instance, the Hearing Officer made his findings in a blatant disregard for the
"facts55 set forth by Appellants. This is wrong.

26

Non-Moving Party's Facts Are Deemed To Control DisputesA basic foundation of all determinations on Rule 56 motions is that the court is to
view all the factual allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.

On review of a summary judgment motion, the party against
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have all
the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom,
considered in a light most favorable to him.
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 259 P.2d 297, 299 [l&2][Utah,
1953]; Mountain States Tel & Tel, v. Garfield County* 811 P.
2d 184, 193 [Utah, 1991]; U. R. C. P. 56 (c).

In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court reviews
the fact and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, including its conclusion that
there are no material fact issues.
Neiderhauser Bldrs & Dev. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193,
1196, [Utah Ct.App., 1992]

Instantly, the Hearing Officer sided with the Appellees' factual contentions: /
found that the facts pleaded and relied upon by the Petitioner are true and
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uncontested. No reasoning why he found this was offered. Record, @ 334 But to
follow the mandates of the law required the Hearing Officer to accept the
Appellants' factual allegations they had set forth in a light most favorable to them.
When the Hearing Officer adopted the Appellees' positions, and when he proffered
no reasoning as to how and why he found no facts in contest, his silence proves to
the reviewing court that he did not view the Appellants' facts and the fair
inferences arising from those facts in a light most favorable to them. If the
Hearing Officer had followed the law, the many conspicuous, factual disputes
would have precluded the grant of summary judgment.

No. 4-

Did the Hearing Officer err in finding Appellees had
standing to bring its Request for Declaratory Judgment?

The only finding the Hearing Officer made was that he found Appellees had
standing to bring its Request for Declaratory Judgment. But he did not justify this
finding by memorializing any support in fact or law. He did however, adopt
Appellee's counsel's referenced to U.C.A., 49-11-613 [entitled, "Appeal
procedure - Right to appeal hearing officer -Board reconsideration - Judicial
review" of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act].
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But a closer look at this statute shows it does not support the finding that the Board
and/or PEHP had authority/standing to bring the Request for Declaratory
Judgment.

In pertinent parts this statute declares:

Any dispute regarding a benefit, right, obligation, or employment
right under this title is subject to the procedures provided under
this section.
A person who disputes a benefit, right, obligation or employment
right under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director.

d-

A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director with
respect to any benefit, right, obligation or employment right under this
title shall request a review of that claim by a hearing officer.
[In this instance, Appellants believe subsections b, c, and d, are
operative clauses and does not directly challenge them.]

Section 49-11-102 entitled "Definitions" of thistle* offers definitions of the terms
used within the Act. It does not define "aperson".

But interestingly, The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language - New College Edition
of 1979 does define a "person" as:

A living human being, especially as distinguishedfrom an animal or thing.

Surely, the State Retirement Board and the PEHP are things.
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Just as surely, Appellants are "persons" and are specially empowered under
Subections c & d above to:

1-

request a ruling by the executive direction,
And if dissatisfied with the ruling to

2-

request a review of that claim by a hearing officer.

Appellants did not request a ruling from the executive director nor request a review
of any ruling by a hearing officer.

The Retirement Board and/or PEHP requested a review by a hearing officer all the
while sidestepping the pre-requisite request for an initial ruling from the executive
director. And they did this without any authority, without any standing to bring the
Request for Declaratory Judgment they did bring.

Clearly, the statute does not confer authority upon the Board or the Plan to bring a
declaratory action. Yet, it is the statute the Hearing Officer adopted and relied
upon to support his legal conclusion. But when the legal conclusion relied upon
does not stand for the proposition proffered, it cannot survive appellate review.

Appellants assert that under U. C. A., 49-11-613, Appellees lack standing to bring
the underlying Request for Declaratory Judgment. This statute defines those who
are permitted to bring an action under Utah State Retirement and Insurance
Benefit Act. PEHP is not mentioned as a person or entity entitled to bring an
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action before a hearing officer or the Board. Members can. Under U. C. A, 49-11613 PEHP is a "program" and programs have limited rights. "Programs" can only
"process claims." UCA 49-20-401 (e) Seeking to enforce subrogation rights is not
"processing a claim." Subrogation rights are not a dispute encompassed within the
parameters of Title 49.

Additionally, UCA 49-11-301(3) says the assets of the fund [program benefit
monies] are for the exclusive benefit of the members and "may not be diverted or
appropriated for any purpose other than that permitted under this title"
Appellees' demand for payback from a "member" is diverting or appropriating
monies not permitted under the title.

Appellees have no standing to have brought these proceedings and in so bringing
them the Request is invalid and must be rejected. While the legislature could have
conferred upon the Board or the Plan authority to bring an action like this, it did
not do so. And in remaining silent, one is required to admit that if the legislature
could have conferred such authority and chose not to, then in "choosing not to"
was an intentional, legislative decision and not an oversight. "Each term in a
statute was used advisedly". Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162,
1168 [Utah, 1995]; Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922,926 [Utah, 1995].
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C O N C L U S I ONThough specifically requested to do so, and legally required to do so, the Hearing
Officer failed to set forth the reasons supporting his grant of summary judgment.
He did this notwithstanding the several questions before him. Record, @ 326,
330, 334 That failure causes Appellants great difficulty in attacking the grant of
summary judgment on specific grounds. All of the subrogation terms of this
insurance contract are in contest as concerns:

• what the terms are and what they mean?
•

if the are enforceable or not and why?

• does extrinsic evidence influence this dispute and how, and to what extent?
and,
•

does public policy influence this dispute and how, and to what extent?

These questions compel the reversal of the grant of summary judgment. In
Colonial Leasing v. Larsen Bros. Const, 731 P.2d 483 [Utah, 1986], the court
addressed this type of contract dispute. It said:

If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in conflict,
the intent of the parties as to the terms of the agreement is
to be determined by a jury.

32

Black letter law holds that:
A summary judgment motion should be granted only when all the
facts entitling the moving party to a judgment are clearly established
or admitted. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 [Utah, 1978]

And it should only be granted when the showing precludes, as a matter of law, all
reasonable possibility that the losing party could win if given a trial. Frederick
May Co. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 [Utah, 1962]; Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980
[Utah, 1972]

The Hearing Officer did not establish the facts Appellees needed to prevail.
Nor, does his Order show [or suggest or even rumor] that Appellants could not win
if given a trial He summarily adopted and concluded there were no disputed
material facts. This conclusion is contrary to the ocean of legal mandates and
factual evidence before him, as the law required specific findings of fact to support
all legal conclusions.

The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of
fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to resolution of dispute
under proper rule of law. To that end findings of fact should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
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the steps by which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached. Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1316, 1338-1339 [Utah, 1979]

Findings are adequate only if they are usufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. " Campbell,
supra, @ 638-639.

Instantly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to state reason for its grant
of summary judgment and the reasons for the grant were not apparent from the
Record. Thus, the grant is legal error. Aurora, supra @ 1281-1282

For the many reasoned arguments set forth hereinabove, this Court properly should
reverse the administrative court's grant of summary judgment and if Appellees had
no authority to bring their Request for Declaratory Judgment, this Court should
dismiss their Request with prejudice.
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Alternatively, this Court should vacate the grant of summary judgment giving
Appellants the opportunity to fully present their defenses. The Appellees will have
ample opportunity to fully prosecute their claims through the regular processing of
their action.

Date: 25, January 2008

!>Wully submitted
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